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Handbook Updates
For those of you subscribing to
the Ag Decision Maker Hand-
book, the following updates are
included.
Crop Planning Prices — File
A1-10 (2 pages)
Commodity Programs for
Crops — File A1-32 (6 pages)
Commodity Program for
Dairy — File B1-55 (2 pages)
2002 Farmland Cash Rental
Rates — File C2-10 (13 pages)
Historic County Cropland
Rental Rates — File C2-11
(5 pages)
Please add these files to your
handbook and remove the out-
of-date material.
Inside . . .
The Iowa Turkey Cooperative
experience—West
Liberty Foods ....................... Page 2
Building your brand with
Flanker Brands .................... Page 4
This is not your father’s
ol’-farm-bill! ........................ Page 5
The 2002 Farm Security andRural Investment Act(FSRIA) extends some of
the payment provisions related to
feed grain and oilseed production,
and adds some new provisions.
The bill provides for three differ-
ent types of payments:
2002 Farm Bill Offers Opportunity to Update
Acres and Yields
by William Edwards, extension economist, 515-294-6161, wedwards@iastate.edu
• Loan Deficiency Payments
or Marketing Assistance
Loans will continue much as
before, but with different loan
rates.
• Direct Payments will replace
AMTA, PFC, Market Loss
Assistance, and Oilseed
Payments.
• Counter Cyclical Payments
are a new payment designed
to offset low market prices.
The crops that are covered by the
bill include corn, soybeans, oats,
wheat, grain sorghum, barley, and
other small grains.  Hay and
forages are not covered.
Decisions
There are three basic decisions to
make regarding the new commod-
ity programs.  These decisions are
made separately for each tract
with a different Farm Service
Agency identification.
1. You can keep your current
program base acres, or update
your base acres to reflect
1998-2001 cropping patterns.
2. If you do not update base
acres, a soybean base will be
created. You can then shift
some base acres from other
program crops into your
soybean base.
3. If you do update base acres,
you can keep your old
program yields based on 1981-
1985 levels, or you can update
yields based on 1998-2001
levels.
The methods used to determine
each type of payment are summa-
rized in the table on page 2.  For
more details on program acres,
yields and payments refer to the
enclosed Decision File.
continued on page 2
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West Liberty Foods has proven that a value-added cooperative owned by Iowa turkeygrowers can carve out a profitable niche in
the marketplace. In just five years, West Liberty
Foods has gone from a fledgling startup company of
425 employees to an industry leader that employs
1,350 and produces more than 120 million pounds of
meat products per year.
Let’s begin by reviewing the short history of the Iowa
Turkey Growers Cooperative.
• In 1943 Louis Rich purchased the West Liberty
Iowa Tomato Canning Plant. At that time he
was operating a small plant in the Quad Cities,
which he had started in 1930.
• In 1946 the plant was converted into a chicken
processing facility.
• In 1948 the sons of Louis Rich, Martin and
Norman, focused the company on production of
turkey products. This focus is on fully cooked
further processed products. Over the next
several years the company introduced many
new turkey products. The company became
known as a turkey product innovator,
introducing a full line of fully cooked turkey
products.
• In 1979 Oscar Mayer purchased the “Louis
Rich” company. The purchase included plants in
West Liberty, Iowa., Modesto, Calif., and
Newberry, S.C.
• In April of 1996, Oscar Mayer, a division of
Kraft Foods, a division of General Foods, a
division of Phillip Morris, announced that they
were closing the West Liberty plant effective
December 31, 1996.
• In May 1996, 47 Iowa turkey growers banded
together to try to find a way to continue
production of turkeys. Their motto became
“Strive to Survive”. Their task was a daunting
one. They would either find a way to continue to
produce turkeys or convert their buildings to
boat storage. Boat storage in Iowa is not an
attractive alternative.
The Growers found they needed to:
• Mortgage everything they owned in order to be
able to continue to produce turkeys.
• Take a risk few individuals would be willing to
take.
• Put together a program of financing with the US
Department of Agriculture (Rural Development
Agency), the State of Iowa (Department of
Economic Development), Muscatine County,
Muscatine Development Corporation, the City
of West Liberty, Norwest Bank, and Kraft
Foods, and do this in a six-month period of time.
With the help of many, many individuals and organi-
zations they were able to pull all the parties together
and a program was launched. On December 27, 1999
the facilities of Kraft Foods in Iowa were transferred
to the Iowa Turkey Growers Cooperative.
Now the real fun began.
The growers discovered that there was nothing easy
about being in the processing and marketing side of
the turkey business. The first turkeys were pro-
cessed by the Cooperative in January 1997. A man-
agement team had been formed in November of
1996. A sales program was nonexistent. The only
program in place was a commitment on Kraft’s part
to take a certain portion of the product from the
plant.
Unfortunately the Cooperative started processing
product during a time of record production and the
lowest price in the history of the modern turkey
business. This low market condition continued
through June of 1998. To give you an idea of how
serious this situation was, the normal break-even
The Iowa Turkey Cooperative experience—
West Liberty Foods
by Kenneth D. Rutledge, President and CEO of West Liberty Foods
Summary of Payment Acres and Yields
Payment Payment Rate per bu. Payment Acres Payment Yield
Loan deficiency Co. loan rate – posted co. price Actual harvested Actual harvested
Direct Fixed rate 85% of old or new base Old program yield
Counter cyclical Target price - higher of 85% of old or new base Old or new program
loan rate or market price - yield
 direct rate
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level for turkey meat is in the $1.60 range. The
market reached a low of $1.07 during the first year
and a half of the Cooperative’s existence.
Significant developments
During the first year and a half; however, many
significant events unfolded:
1. Two companies closed sizable turkey plants and
idled or converted them to chicken.
2. The industry began to exercise serious
production restraint.
3. Supply and demand came into balance. As an
old friend used to say, “The law of supply and
demand will never be repealed.
4. A major player in the business decided to
discontinue slaughter operations.
5. The sales and marketing programs the West
Liberty Foods staff had been pursuing began to
bear fruit.
6. Strategic alliances began to be put into place.
• A private label line of high-end deli products for
the largest retailer in the country and for
another midsize retailer was developed and
began to be distributed.
• A co-manufacturing agreement of major volume
levels was concluded with one of the largest food
companies in the world.
• The program with Oscar Mayer was continued
and strengthened beyond the initial two-year
period.
• The plant began production of beef, pork, and
chicken products in addition to turkey.
• The plant became the major producer of deli
items for two of the largest sandwich shops in
the U.S.
• The company began to receive recognition as a
preferred production unit.
In January 1999, a very viable Cooperative emerges
from the trying 1997 and 1998 experiences. The
Cooperative continues to seek out business opportu-
nities to insulate it from the vagaries of the commod-
ity turkey market, even setting plans for a natural
turkey product line.
In 1997, the Cooperative processed 2.9 million head
of turkeys from our members. In 1999 we completed
the year with over 4.5 million head of turkeys
processed. During the 2000 calendar year we not
The Iowa Turkey Cooperative experience—West Liberty Foods, continued from page 2
only processed 4.5 million head but also purchased
the equivalent of over 1.0 million additional head in
the form of deboned meat from other companies.
In 2000, the Cooperative concluded the purchase of
another 50,000 square foot processing facility in
Sigourney, Iowa.
Ninety percent of the products manufactured by
West Liberty Foods are branded and sold by other
companies and ten percent are marketed under the
West Liberty Foods label.
The future opportunity for West Liberty Foods lies
in selecting the appropriate partners from a co-
manufacturing and private label standpoint, negoti-
ating long term financially favorable agreements
which will continue to insulate us from severe
market swings, continue to seek out higher margin
niche markets to blend in with the co-manufactur-
ing/private label product and continue to improve to
the most efficient production level at the plant.
If we are able to accomplish these tasks, we will
provide to our grower/owners a profitable, sustain-
able business which can be passed down to the next
generation as a financial investment worthy of their
time and money. This is the key to a cooperative’s
long term viability and survivability.
In a recent article from a trade publication ranking
the top 200 meat and poultry processors based on
sales revenue, West Liberty Foods ranked #157 in
1998, #90 in 1999 and #75 in 2000. We ended F/Y
2000 at over $135 million in revenue. We have
arrived and we intend to stay a viable food produc-
tion entity for the long term.
Drivers of the future
We are concentrating on three major trends that we
believe will drive our business for the future and
will also be applicable to any other cooperative food
venture.
Brand Marketing
Brand marketing in the future will focus corporate
shareholder attention on marketing of the end
product and cause major food companies to look for
strategic alliance partners to grow, slaughter and
process product. This is already happening at West
Liberty Foods. This trend has resulted in four
separate co-manufacturing agreements at West
Liberty Foods with four of the largest food compa-
nies in the country.
The example used as the ultimate brand-marketing
program is Nike. Nike owns no production facilities.
continued on page 4
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The Iowa Turkey Cooperative experience—West Liberty Foods, continued from page 3
This article is second in a five-part series onbuilding a brand and developing it in themarketplace. The previous article outlined the
importance of branding and the process of creating a
brand for a new product. This article moves ahead to
developing flanker brands.
What is a flanker brand?
A flanker brand is a new brand introduced into the
market by a company that already has an estab-
lished brand in the same product category. The new
brand is designed to compete in the category
without damaging the existing item’s market
share by targeting a different group of consum-
ers. This strategy, also called fighter branding or
multibranding, is used to achieve a larger total
market share than one product could garner alone.
Companies with multiple brands in a single product
category generally have the following types of
products in their portfolios:
• A premium brand that offers high quality at a
higher price.
• One or more “value” brands offering a slightly
lower quality or a different set of benefits for a
lower price.
For example, General Mills markets both Gold
Medal and Robin Hood brand flours. Gold Medal
serves as a premium product and commands a
premium price from consumers who value quality.
However, Robin Hood offers a lower-priced product
with a slightly lower level of quality for those who
are more heavily influenced by the price of products
within a category.
Why is flanker branding important?
Flanker branding is important because it allows a
company to attract new customers from various
market segments. The main brand of a company’s
portfolio should target the market segment contain-
ing the most consumers. Another brand can then be
positioned to convert users from other market
segments by using a different set of benefits or
product characteristics. For example, Proctor and
Gamble’s (P&G) Tide is an extremely successful
laundry detergent. In order to appeal to consumers
who desired a lower-cost detergent, P&G introduced
Cheer, which is a slightly lower quality product
offered at a value price. While Tide’s sales dropped
slightly with the introduction of the new brand, the
combined sales of Cheer and Tide were higher than
Tide’s original sales alone, allowing P&G to gain a
greater market share. A company’s brands should
attract customers from competing brands and
not each other.
There are a number of advantages to developing a
flanker brand:
• Gain more shelf space for the company, which
increases retailer dependence on the company’s
brands.
• Capture “brand switchers” by offering several
brands.
• Develop excitement within the company by
monitoring sales figures of the different brands.
• Protect the company – giving a product its own
unique name means it will not be readily
associated with the existing brand. This reduces
risk to the existing brand and/or company if the
product fails.
Building your brand with Flanker Brands
by Nancy Giddens, agricultural extension value-added marketing specialist, Missouri
Value-added Development Center, University of Missouri; and Amanda Hofmann,
student research assistant
All of their product is co-manufactured. This trend
bodes very well for the future of West Liberty Foods.
Private Label
Private label food production is very different today
from the old generic labeled product you used to see
in the grocery store. Major retailers today want to
place their store’s name on upper end, high quality
products. The private label business in 2000 grew at
a rate of almost 10 percent. Branded product had a
flat growth year. Most branded producers do not
want to produce private label products, thus a
continuing avenue of opportunity exists for West
Liberty Foods.
Food Safety
Food safety is the issue of the new millennium. If
you are planning to build a food production facility,
you have a golden opportunity to build a state-of-the-
art facility with food safety as the integral part. At
West Liberty Foods we inherited an existing facility.
We continue to remodel our facility to provide the
safest environment for food production. An example
of this is our newly completed segregated facilities
for our cook side employees. This means no daily
contact between raw side and cook side employees. If
you expect to be chosen by major food companies and
by retailers as the production facility of choice, you
had better provide a reason for them to select your
company.
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Many of you will remember the advertisingjingle, “This is not your father’sOldsmobile.” Well, with apologies to
General Motors and despite what I read in the press
about the 2002 Farm Bill beating a hasty retreat
from the free market reforms that have been in the
works since 1985 and were fully implemented in the
1996 Farm Bill, I keep hearing this jingle running
through my head, “This is not your father’s ol’-farm-
bill.”
Neither is it, as some wags would have it, “Back to
the Future: Part Ag.” Michael J. Fox need not apply
for a starring role because there is little in this farm
bill that reflects traditional farm policy.
Those who would call the 2002 Farm Bill “Freedom
to Farm on Steroids,” “Super Freedom to Farm,” or
“Freedom to Farm Plus” are much closer to the
truth. The legislation that was recently signed into
law by the president is clearly the offspring of
Freedom to Farm and bears little resemblance to the
traditional farm programs of the 1930s through the
1970s.
Some analysts seem to be suggesting that because
the 2002 Farm Bill includes high government costs
and large payments to farmers it is a return to what
they call “the failed policies of the past.” High govern-
ment costs are not an essential feature of the tradi-
tional farm programs that have roots going back to
the 1930s.
Rather, the essential features of traditional farm
programs are:
• supply control mechanisms;
• price supports with an accompanying stock
inventory mechanism; and
• more recently, a structured buffer stock program
designed to stabilize prices both on the bottom
and on the top.
Even though the 2002 Farm Bill uses some terms
from these types of programs it does not depend on
any of these traditional policy mechanisms.
Instead of these traditional policy instruments, the
2002 Farm Bill is firmly rooted in the policies that
• Companies with a high-quality existing product
can introduce lower-quality brands without
diluting their high-quality brand names. For
example, Farmland markets three separate
brand name hams: Carando, Farmland and
Ohse. Carando, a premium product with a
distinctive spicy flavor is targeted toward
individuals who desire high quality and
authentic Italian flavor in hams. Due to these
qualities, Carando commands a premium price.
Farmland brand hams are more middle of the
road – good quality, traditional hams targeted
toward family-minded consumers who desire
quality but also pay close attention to price.
Finally, Ohse is a value product – its lower
level of quality is reflected in its bargain price.
The Farmland name only is attached to the
Farmland product, leaving consumers with a
separate view of each brand. They do not lose
respect for the quality of the Carando or
Farmland branded products because of the
lower quality of the Ohse products because
there is not a clear connection between the
three brands.
Developing flanker brands does present challenges.
Introducing a new brand is quite costly. Creating
another independent brand requires name research
and substantial advertising expenditures to create
name recognition and preference for the new brand.
Will Flanker Branding Work for You?
Flanker branding is not for everyone. There are a
number of questions that must be answered in order
to make the best decision for your situation. The most
basic questions include:
• Can my existing brand be changed enough that a
new brand will have unique qualities that will
appeal to a separate group of consumers?
• Are these new qualities believable?
• How will the new brand impact my existing
brand(s)?
• How will the new brand impact competitors’
brands?
• Will the cost of product development and
promotion be covered by the sales of the new
brand?
A flanker branding strategy can be very effective if
implemented appropriately. The next article in this
series will examine another type of branding –
product line extensions.
This is not your father’s ol’-farm-bill!
by Daryll E. Ray, Blasingame Chair of Excellence in Agricultural Policy, Institute of
Agriculture, University of Tennessee, and Director, UT’s Agricultural Policy Analysis
Center. (865)974-7407;  dray@utk.edu; http://www.agpolicy.org.
Building your brand with Flanker Brands, continued from page 4
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. . . and justice for all
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibits
discrimination in all its programs and activities on the basis of
race, color, national origin, gender, religion, age, disability,
political beliefs, sexual orientation, and marital or family status.
(Not all prohibited bases apply to all programs.) Many
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began with the 1985 Farm Bill and reached their
zenith in Freedom to Farm:
• dependence upon market mechanisms to
manage supply and demand;
• income support; and
• a mechanism to allow prices to drop as low as
they want to go.
Some would say the 2002 farm legislation is a
“return to the failed farm policies of the MOST
RECENT past.”
After all, the 2002 Farm Bill relies solely on market
mechanisms and hoped-for growth in export markets
to balance out supply and demand for major agricul-
tural crops. A look at the baseline numbers used by
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to project the
costs of the legislation makes it clear that propo-
nents are depending upon significant growth in
export markets fueled by the increasing growth of a
middle class in developing nations, especially those
in Asia. It was this same hoped-for growth in the
Chinese middle class that fueled the unfulfilled
expectations for Freedom to Farm. There is little to
indicate that the results will be any different this
time around.
Likewise, the direct payments (old AMTA) and
counter-cyclical payments are clearly oriented
toward supporting farm income rather than commod-
ity prices. The direct payments are based on historic
production levels and can be received by farmers
whether or not they plant anything. The target
prices or counter-cyclical payments again are de-
signed to support farm income and bear no resem-
blance whatever to the target prices of old. This time
around the target price is a variable rate “extra”
AMTA payment program that replaces annual
legislative action on emergency payments with a pre-
authorized sliding scale mechanism to disperse the
emergency payments. Again, note that farmers do
not have to produce the crop in question to receive
the payments.
Some have contended that the reason the free
market mechanisms do not work to adjust supply is
the level of these income support payments. They
argued for lower loan rates asserting that if these
prices are too high they interfere with market
signals, encouraging over-production.
We believe that lower loan rates (and lower
“decoupled” payments, since it all tends to be viewed
the same by farmers) might reduce crop production
slightly, but production would remain at near
current levels since farmers have little incentive or
inclination to voluntarily reduce their acreage.
The new legislation also continues the use of Loan
Deficiency Payments (LDPs) which provides no limit
as to how far commodity prices can fall.
The commodity portion of the 2002 Farm Bill con-
tains none of the marks of a traditional farm bill that
one could characterize as “your father’s ol’-farm-bill.”
Rather, doesn’t it seem more like a “Son-of-Pat”
(Roberts) Freedom to Farm II piece of legislation?
This is not your father’s ol’-farm-bill!, continued from page 5
